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CALIFORNIA DIVIDED: THE RESTRICTIONS AND
VULNERABILITIES IN IMPLEMENTING SB 54
Jerome Ma† & Nicholas Pavlovic‡
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
significantly relies on state and local personnel and resources to carry
out enforcement of immigration law. California Senate Bill 54 (“SB
54”), the “California Values Act,” is California’s attempt to
disentangle local law enforcement from federal civil immigration
enforcement. This Article offers an in-depth evaluation of SB 54’s
mechanics; identifies vulnerabilities that exist despite SB 54 and
potential means for law enforcement agencies (“LEAs”) to combat
these issues; and comments on how local individual LEAs and the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation have chosen
to exercise the discretion to comply (or not comply) with immigration
hold/detainer requests from the federal government, as well as
information and data-sharing requests, within the framework of SB 54.
The constitutionality of SB 54 is not the focus of this Article,
rather, the focus is on the myriad of issues implicated in California's
attempts to restrict cooperation and communication with federal
immigration enforcement. SB 54 provides a strong framework for
accomplishing these goals, but nonetheless remains vulnerable to
exploitation, such as LEAs making release dates publicly available,
and falls short in addressing overarching issues such as ICE access to
law enforcement databases.

† Jerome Ma is a J.D. candidate at Santa Clara University School of Law, class of 2018. He holds
a B.S. in aerospace engineering and a minor in Asian American studies from the University of
California, Los Angeles.
‡ Nicholas Pavlovic is a J.D. candidate at Santa Clara University School of Law, class of 2019.
He holds a B.A. in history from the University of California, Merced.
We thank Professor Pratheepan Gulasekaram for his support, guidance, and knowledge in helping
us navigate this subject matter. We also thank Sara Foghani and David Muegge for their
comments and suggestions. This is our final work product of our Immigration Law & Policy
Practicum, an immigration course taught by Professor Gulasekaram at the Santa Clara University
School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION

California Senate Bill 54 (“SB 54”) and its precursors are an
immensely complex package of legislation aimed at combating
multiple expansive and multi-faceted issues—the sharing of data, the
bilateral communications, and the concerted custody of undocumented
immigrants between federal and local law enforcement agencies.1 The
legislative history of SB 54 indicates that its purpose is to provide
numerous safeguards for immigrants when interacting with law
enforcement agencies (“LEAs”). 2 The primary objective of the law is
to ensure that local LEAs do not facilitate federal immigration
enforcement by unnecessarily communicating with federal
immigration authorities or otherwise aiding in enforcement efforts.
Federal case law has clearly stated immigration enforcement falls
squarely on the shoulders of the federal government.3 Despite the
rationale that the federal government should fully undertake
immigration enforcement matters, the federal government frequently
and actively seeks local LEA participation in order to accomplish said
responsibility. When local LEAs do not comply, the federal
government attempt to “coerce localities to participate in immigration
enforcement and punish those that pursue ‘sanctuary.’”4 Reacting to
the federal government’s expropriating of state resources, the state of
California enacted SB 54—a statewide minimum standard—which
directs local LEAs to not facilitate nor participate via specified means
to enforce the federal government’s immigration responsibility, unless
certain exceptions apply. However, SB 54 leaves significant discretion
to LEAs in its implementation and, like any legislation, is not infallible.
This policy memorandum examines three distinct facets of SB 54:
1. See S.B. 54, 2017 Leg., 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (to be codified
at CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 7282, 7282.5, & 7284).
2. S.B. 54 § 3, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6 (“This chapter seeks to ensure effective policing,
to protect the safety, well-being, and constitutional rights of the people of California, and to direct
the state’s limited resources to matters of greatest concern to state and local governments.”);
California Committee Report, S.B. 54, 2017-2018 Sess., at 2 (Sept. 11, 2017) (“Exempt the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from the provisions of the bill, but
require the Department to provide increased protections and equal treatment to immigrant
inmates.”).
3. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that power retained by states
over criminal matters could not be used to control immigration by discrimination between citizens
and noncitizens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“Deportation is not
a punishment for crime.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
4. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 58 B.C.L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (citation omitted).
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(1) Provide an overview of the protections offered by SB 54;
(2) Identify vulnerabilities that exist despite SB 54 and potential
means for individual LEAs to combat these issues; and
(3) Determine how individual LEAs and the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)
have chosen to exercise the discretion within the framework
of SB 54.
Further, this Article aims to uncover competing motivations that
influence whether SB 54 have the ultimate support of local LEAs.
Accordingly, section I of this Article provides a brief overview of
the protections offered by SB 54 by first giving the historical context
of sanctuary cities and the legal framework undergirding SB 54, then
offering an in-depth evaluation of SB 54’s mechanics (e.g., the
restriction placed on LEAs prohibiting communications with ICE
unless certain exceptions apply), and finally illustrating the federal
government’s response to SB 54. Section II of this Article identifies
vulnerabilities that exist despite SB 54 (e.g., whether LEAs have the
ability to inquire about place of birth as a proxy to asking about
immigration status) and potential means for individual LEAs to combat
these issues. Section III reports how individual LEAs and the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation have chosen
to exercise the discretion within the framework of SB 54 (including
select “anti-immigrant” and “pro-immigrant” California LEA policies).
Section IV offers legislative and LEA policy implementation
recommendations moving forward.
I.

CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 54

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
significantly relies on state and local personnel and resources to carry
out its enforcement of immigration law. Like all government agencies,
ICE operates on a finite budget—nearly $8 billion for the 2018 Fiscal
Year.5 While ICE6 alone is responsible for the deportation of an
individual, the necessary first step is to physically obtain custody of

5. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2018 BUDGET-IN-BRIEF 11 & 33
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/fy-2018-budget-brief (showing a 2018 budget request of
$7,942,072,000. In FY 2016, ICE removed 240,255 individuals, 217,760 of which ICE identified
as a threat to “national security, border security, and public safety.”)
6. Id.
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that individual.7 This is very often facilitated by the use of local law
enforcement.8 Law enforcement databases, physical access to jails,
deputization of local LEOs, joint task forces, informal communication
and tips from LEOs, and other methods all provide ICE with
information with minimal involvement from ICE.9 Even in the absence
of formal programs, many counties willingly cooperate with ICE and
use local resources and personnel to assist in immigration
enforcement.10 It is under this background of extensive local LEA
participation in federal immigration enforcement that SB 54 was
enacted.
SB 54, the “California Values Act,” is California’s attempt to
disentangle local law enforcement from federal civil immigration
enforcement. SB 54 is a California Senate Bill authored by Senator
Kevin de Léon and signed into law by California Governor Jerry
Brown on October 5, 2017. In enacting SB 54, the California legislature
found that the trust relationship between California’s immigrant
community and state and local law enforcement became threatened
when those agencies’ operations and duties became entangled with
federal immigration enforcement. This entanglement made it difficult
for immigrant communities to approach the police, diverted state and
local agency funding, and raised constitutional concerns.11 With these
concerns in mind, the legislature enacted SB 54 to further distinguish
federal immigration enforcement from state and local law enforcement
and place limitations on the actions local law enforcement agencies
may take to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law.
7. Morgan Smith & Terri Langford, Federal Deportation Policy Depends on Sheriffs,
Local Jails to Detain Criminal Immigrants, TEX. TRIBUNE (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://valleycentral.com/news/local/federal-deportation-policy-depends-on-sheriffs-local-jailsto-detain-criminal-immigrants.
8. NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. CTR., UNTANGLING THE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WEB:
BASIC INFORMATION FOR ADVOCATES ABOUT DATABASES AND INFORMATION-SHARING
AMONG FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES (2017), https://www.nilc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Untangling-Immigration-Enforcement-Web-2017-09.pdf [hereinafter
NILC, UNTANGLING].
9. Id.
10. LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY AN ANALYSIS OF
AMERICA’S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH DEPORTATIONS 11 (2016),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final_1-min.pdf (Out of 2,556
counties surveyed, 1,922 will hold individuals on the basis of a detainer and 2,053 allow county
employees to use local resources to assist ICE in federal immigration enforcement
responsibilities.)
11. S.B. 54, 2017 Leg. § 3, 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6 (West).
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A. The Background Behind SB 54
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1373
Section 1373 of Title 8 of the United States Code is central to the
purpose of SB 54 and, in fact, all state laws that relate to immigration,
in the sense that it stakes out the metes and bounds of federal and state
jurisdiction. Section 1373 provides that “a Federal, State, or local
government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict,
any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.”12 At least in one California jurisdiction has narrowly
construed section 1373 to apply to direct prohibitions on
communicating immigration status.13 Further, federal law does not
mandate state and local law enforcement to affirmatively communicate
with the federal government.14 Therefore, state legislation cannot
directly prohibit state and local law enforcement from communicating
immigration status to immigration authorities.
2. Sanctuary City History
Before any state law placed prohibitions on federal immigration
enforcement assistance, individual cities and counties made grassroots
efforts and initiatives to self-impose such restrictions. In 1971,
Berkeley passed a resolution that forbid city employees from assisting
in the enforcement of federal immigration law.15 While this initial
resolution related to conscientious objectors of the Vietnam War, by
1985, Berkeley adopted a resolution declaring it a sanctuary city for
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Steinle v. City & Cty. of S.F., 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1015 n.9 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
6, 2017) (“[Section] 1373(a) . . . do[es] not limit a sheriff’s authority to set ‘policies regarding the
manner in which his employees speak on behalf of the Department in response to ICE’s voluntary
requests.’”).
14. Lena Graber & Annie Benson, FAQ on 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and Federal Funding Threats
to “Sanctuary Cities,” IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Apr. 2017),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/8_usc_1373_and_federal_funding_threats_to_s
anctuary_cities.pdf.
15. Sanctuary City, MAYOR JESSE ARREGUIN, https://www.jessearreguin.com/sanctuarycity/ (last visited May 2, 2018) (“As a sanctuary city, Berkeley has committed to not support,
communicate with or submit to the demands of federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officers. Our community believes in protecting all of our residents and letting them know
they are safe, regardless of their immigration status.”).
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undocumented refugees.16 In the decades to follow, a number of
California cities followed suit. In 1989, San Francisco enacted its
sanctuary city ordinance.17 San Francisco’s sanctuary city ordinance is
significantly more extensive than others in California and reads more
like a codified law than a city council resolution.18 Regardless of their
depth, sanctuary city ordinances demonstrate the importance many
California cities place on protecting their immigrant populations even
in the absence of state laws requiring them to do so.
3. The TRUST Act
The TRUST Act was California’s first foray into statewide
regulations restricting cooperation with federal immigration
authorities. Specifically, the TRUST Act addresses the range of
circumstances a California law enforcement agency may comply with
an immigration detainer (or “detainer”) issued by federal immigration
authorities. As defined by the TRUST Act, a detainer is a request by
ICE to a local law enforcement agency to hold an individual for up to
48 hours after their initial release date and advise authorized
immigration officers prior to the release of that individual.19 The
California legislature found that, under the Secure Communities
program, ICE began relying on local law enforcement to shoulder a
part of the burden of enforcing federal civil immigration law.
According to the California legislature, this resulted in allocation of
law enforcement resources to federal immigration matters, concerns
over the erroneous issuance of detainers, and degradation of the
relationship between law enforcement and immigrant communities.20
Under the TRUST Act, a California law enforcement agency is
prohibited from complying with ICE detainers unless one of six
exceptions applies. Even if the exceptions apply, the choice is
discretionary and said law enforcement agency can still choose not to
comply with the detainer. The exceptions are as follows: an exception
exists if the individual has been convicted of: 1) a serious or violent

16. Id.
17. Lasch et al., supra note 4 (manuscript at 31 n.137) (citing San Francisco, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 375-89 (Oct. 24, 1989)).
18. Sanctuary City Ordinance, OFF. OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT & IMMIGRANT AFF.,
http://sfgov.org/oceia/sanctuary-city-ordinance-0 (last visited May 2, 2018).
19. Assemb. B. 4, 2013 Leg. § 2, 2013-14 Sess., 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2 (West).
20. Id.
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felony, 2) a felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison, 3) a
specified wobbler offense within the past five years for a misdemeanor
or at any time for a felony, 4) an INA aggravated felony, 5) the
individual is a current registrant on the California Sex and Arson
Registry, or 6) a probable cause determination by a magistrate of a
serious or violent felony, felony punishable by imprisonment in state
prison, or wobbler felony other than domestic violence.21 If none of
these conditions are met then the individual may not be detained past
their scheduled release date. These conditions set forth by the TRUST
Act retain significant importance in the operation of SB 54.
4. The TRUTH Act
Two years following the TRUST Act, California enacted the
TRUTH Act, giving additional protections to immigrants in the
custody of local law enforcement. The California legislature took
further issue with the federal government’s Secure Communities
program’s lack of transparency and accountability.22 To begin with, the
TRUTH Act established mandatory written consent forms, available in
six languages, to be given to any individual in local law enforcement
custody prior to any interview with ICE regarding civil immigration
violations. The consent form must explain “the purpose of the
interview, that the interview is voluntary, and that [the interviewee]
may decline to be interviewed or may choose to be interviewed only
with his or her attorney present.”23 Additionally, “[u]pon receiving any
ICE hold, notification, or transfer request, the local law enforcement
agency shall provide a copy of the request to the individual and inform
him or her whether the law enforcement agency intends to comply with
the request.”24 Should the law enforcement agency, in accordance with
the restrictions of the TRUST Act, choose to comply with a notification
request the same notification must be given to the individual and either
his or her attorney or another designated person. Third, in furtherance
of the goal of transparency, all records related to ICE access provided
by a local law enforcement agency are public records. Finally, should
a law enforcement agency provide ICE access to an individual during
21. Id.
22. Assemb. B. 2792, 2016 Leg. § 2(b) [hereinafter TRUTH Act], 2015-16 Sess., 2016
Cal. Legis. Serv. 2 (West).
23. TRUTH Act § 3, 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4.
24. Id.
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a given year, that law enforcement's governing city and/or county must
hold at least one public community forum the following year “to
provide information to the public about ICE’s access to individuals and
to receive and consider public comment.”25
B. The Mechanics of SB 54
SB 54 covers law enforcement agencies in California. As such, it
is important to note the variety of agencies included in the law’s ambit.
SB 54 sets forth numerous prohibitions and limitations, many an
extension of prior legislation or a response to undesirable practices that
existed despite prior legislation. To best explain the requirements and
logic of SB 54, this memorandum will explain a specific provision of
SB 54, the past practice, if any, that provision addresses, and where
that provision fits within prior legislation.
1. Communication
We start our examination of SB 54 with its prohibitions on
communication with immigration authorities. Because section 1373
prohibits total restrictions on communication with immigration
authorities, SB 54’s prohibitions on communication instead deal with
learning an individual’s immigration status in the first place and
communicating information to immigration authorities that would
allow them to take an individual in to custody.
SB 54’s first major communication restriction states that
“California law enforcement agencies shall not (1) Use agency or
department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain,
detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes,
including any of the following: (A) Inquiring into an individual’s
immigration status.”26 This prohibition on inquiring about immigration
status does not have any analogs in prior legislation but is clearly
intended to allow immigrants to interact with police without worrying
about being forced to disclose their status and facing any consequences
associated with such disclosure. Essentially, if an officer never learns
of an individual’s immigration status then there is nothing that can be
passed along to immigration authorities.
Finally, this prohibition helps to combat any potential instances of
discrimination based on perceived immigration status—if a LEO
25.
26.

TRUTH Act § 3, 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4-5.
S.B. 54, 2017 Leg. § 3, 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 7 (West).
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believes a person to be undocumented, he is prohibited from
confirming his suspicions. In contrast, Arizona’s SB 1070 required the
opposite of SB 54 in that LEOs were required to determine an
individual’s immigration status during a lawful stop, a practice that was
upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Arizona.27 Thus, in
some ways, this provision in SB 54 is an affirmative repudiation of the
“stop and prove legal status” practice and precludes any LEA from
enacting their own guidelines to emulate this.
Furthermore, SB 54 prohibits communicating “information
regarding a person’s release date . . . unless that information is available
to the public, or is in response to a notification request from
immigration authorities in accordance with Section 7282.5” and
“personal information, as defined in Section 1798.3 of the Civil Code,
about an individual.”28 The logic of these novel provisions is that even
if LEAs must communicate certain information under section 1373,
immigration authorities must still obtain custody of an individual,
which is difficult to do without cooperation from the LEA holding that
individual or that individual’s work or home address. Notably, SB 54
does not totally prohibit the communication of release dates in all
circumstances. Information available to the public may be readily
communicated. Otherwise, section 7282.5 of the California
Government Code, as amended by SB 54, provides a list of
circumstances in which notification of release date is permitted, but not
required. This list of exceptions was first created by the TRUST Act.
These exceptions can be broken down into six categories: the
individual in question has been convicted of (1) a serious or violent
27. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (holding that all other provisions of
Arizona SB 1070 are preempted). The Court found that:
[s]ection 2(B) of S.B. 1070 requires state officers to make a “reasonable attempt .
. . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest
on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11–
1051(B) (West 2012). The law also provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested
shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is
released.” Ibid. The accepted way to perform these status checks is to contact ICE,
which maintains a database of immigration records.
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411. Finding that section 2(B) was not preempted, the Supreme Court went
on to state that “Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with
ICE in these situations, however. Indeed, it has encouraged the sharing of information about
possible immigration violations.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 412. Furthermore, because the law had not
yet been implemented it would be “inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way that
creates a conflict with federal law.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415.
28. S.B. 54, 2017 Leg. § 3, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 8 (West).
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felony, (2) a felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison, (3) a
“wobbler” offense within the past five years if a misdemeanor or fifteen
if a felony, (4) an INA aggravated felony, (5) the individual is a current
registrant on the California Sex and Arson Registry, and (6) a probable
cause determination by a magistrate of a serious or violent felony or
felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison.
2. Deputization
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
allows local law enforcement to enter into written agreements
(Memoranda of Agreement (“MOAs”) or Memoranda of
Understanding (“MOUs”)) with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in which a local LEO is deputized and undertakes the duties of
a federal immigration officer. Deputized officers undergo a training
course, are supervised by ICE, and must abide by relevant laws and
procedures governing the conduct of federal immigration officers.29 As
a general matter, deputized officers interview individuals to determine
their immigration status and cross-check that information against DHS
databases. If an individual is found to have immigration violations, the
deputized officer informs their ICE supervisor who would take steps to
prosecute or obtain custody of the individual.30
Section 287(g) agreements (“287(g) agreements”), however, have
been fraught with issues in their administration. To begin with, ICE
has, in many instances, failed to provide clear guidance or supervision
to deputized officers.31 As a result, many individuals were targeted who
posed no threat to public safety or had only committed misdemeanors
or minor traffic offenses.32 Furthermore, while ICE pays to train the
29. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement between Orange County Sheriff’s Department
and U.S.
Immigration and
Customs
Enforcement
2-4 (Nov. 2,
2006),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/countyoforange.pdf.
30. HOW ICE USES LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS TO FUNNEL PEOPLE INTO THE
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION SYSTEM 2, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 2014),
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/state-local-enforcement-and-ice-2014-0325.pdf [hereinafter NILC, LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS].
31. Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-10-63, THE
PERFORMANCE
OF
287(G)
AGREEMENTS
10
(Mar.
2010),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf (“However, we observed
inconsistencies in the level and type of supervision over 287(g) program officers and related
activities in participating jurisdictions. This inconsistency could jeopardize the integrity of the
287(g) program and its ability to perform immigration enforcement activities appropriately.”).
32. Id. at 9 (“We obtained arrest information for a sample of 280 aliens identified through
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officers, basically none of the other costs associated with the program
are covered by the federal government.33 The LEO is still paid by the
local LEA, uses LEA facilities, and supplies, and any detainee is
housed by the LEA.34 Finally, 287(g) agreements can lead to distrust
by immigrant communities and in egregious cases, racial profiling.35
As a result of these numerous issues with 287(g) agreements, SB
54 goes beyond prior legislation and wholly prohibits any law
enforcement agency from “[placing] peace officers under the
supervision of federal agencies or [employing] peace officers
deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for
purposes of immigration enforcement.” As of late December of 2017,
Orange County Sheriff’s Department cancelled the last active 287(g)
agreement held by a California LEA.36 While prior federal court cases37
challenged the constitutionality of 287(g) agreements and some
California law enforcement agencies, such as San Bernardino County
Sheriff’s Department, cancelled their 287(g) agreements as a result of
these decisions,38 no California law affirmatively prohibited such
agreements until SB 54.

the 287(g) program at four program sites we visited. Based on the arresting offense, 263, or 94%,
were within one of the three priority levels; however, only 26, or 9%, were within Level 1, and
122, or 44%, were within Level 2. These results do not show that 287(g) resources have been
focused on aliens who pose the greatest risk to the public.”).
33. NILC, LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, at 2.
34. See id.
35. Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE
Criminal
Alien
Program,
WARREN
INST.
(Sept.
2009),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf.
36. Alma Fausto & Roxana Kopetman, Sheriff’s Department No Longer Checking
Immigration Status of Inmates, Cancels Agreement with ICE, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Dec. 28,
2017, 11:09 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/12/27/sheriffs-department-no-longerchecking-immigration-status-of-inmates-cancels-agreement-with-ice/.
37. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
50340 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.R.I. 2014); Galarza
v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905
(S.D. Ind. 2011).
38. Press Release, San Bernardino Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., Immigration and Nationality Act,
287(g)
Program
(May
15,
2014),
http://cms.sbcounty.gov/sheriff/MediaCenter/SheriffPressReleases/PressReleasesfor2014/May/I
mmigrationandNationalityAct287gProgram.aspx,
[http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:sCOqEheAawJ:cms.sbcounty.gov/sheriff/MediaCenter/SheriffPressReleases/PressReleasesfor20
14/May/ImmigrationandNationalityAct287gProgram.aspx+&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&cli
ent=firefox-b-1].
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3. Restrictions on Joint Task Forces

In a similar vein as 287(g) agreements, joint task forces (“JTFs”)
are another way for federal immigration authorities to conscript the
manpower of local law enforcement agencies. JTFs essentially allow
local and federal law enforcement agencies to pool their resources
together to accomplish mutual enforcement goals. Of course, not all
JTFs are entered into with federal immigration authorities, but those
that are carry the potential to result in arrests based on civil immigration
violations.
In response to these concerns and with an understanding of the
significant benefits that JTFs provide to local communities, SB 54
prohibits only those JTFs whose “primary purpose [is] immigration
enforcement.”39 As a further protection, JTFs are permitted only when
“[t]he enforcement or investigative duties are primarily related to a
violation of state or federal law unrelated to immigration
enforcement.”40 Of course, this does not preclude local law
enforcement from entering into a JTF with ICE, nor does it prohibit
any JTF that could result in arrests for immigration violations.
However, as a final protective measure, LEAs must report on the
details of the JTF as well as the number of immigration and nonimmigration arrests made. That data is made publicly available and
aggregated by the California Attorney General.
4. Restrictions on Honoring Detainers
A detainer, is essentially a request from ICE to a LEA that the
LEA assist ICE in obtaining custody of a specific individual. These
requests are wholly voluntary, and an LEA is in no way compelled to
comply.41 ICE submits these requests to LEAs based on immigration
violations they suspect an individual in LEA has committed. SB 54
parses out detainers into three distinct requests: “hold requests,”
notification requests,” and “transfer requests.” Under a hold request, an
individual is detained for additional time past their scheduled release
date, typically 48 hours. Under a notification request, the LEA
communicates the individual’s release date to ICE and ICE arranges to

39. S.B. 54, 2017 Leg. § 3, 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 9 (West).
40. Id.
41. Immigration Detainers: An Overview, at 1, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-detainers-overview.
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take that individual into custody. Under a transfer request, the
individual is directly transferred to ICE custody.
SB 54 prohibits an LEA from “[d]etaining an individual on the
basis of a hold request.” That means that an LEA may never hold an
individual past his specified release date in response to a request from
ICE to do so. This, however, does not preclude ICE from obtaining
custody of the individual by utilizing the other two kinds of requests.
Like the TRUST Act before it, SB 54 restricts LEAs in their
ability to honor notification requests.42 SB 54 restricts a LEAs ability
to honor transfer requests in a similar fashion to its restrictions on
notification of release dates. Much like notification of release date,
detainers are the means by which ICE obtains custody over an
individual they suspect of violating immigration law. Even if ICE
suspects an individual of violating immigration law, they cannot
actually prosecute that individual without custody. SB 54 requires that
there be a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination
before honoring a transfer request. Additionally, the same exceptions
for requests for notification apply: (1) a serious or violent felony, (2) a
felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison, (3) a “wobbler”
offense within the past five years if a misdemeanor or fifteen if a
felony, (4) an INA aggravated felony, (5) the individual is a current
registrant on the California Sex and Arson Registry, and (6) a probable
cause determination by a magistrate of s serious or violent felony or
felony punishable by imprisonment in state prison.
SB 54’s prohibitions on honoring detainers build off the TRUST
Act’s regulation of that same subject. Taking effect in 2014, the
TRUST Act similarly restricted the circumstances in which LEAs
could honor detainer requests. The TRUST Act’s provisions are almost
identical to SB 54’s with only a few differences. First, SB 54 expanded
the TRUST Act’s language of “immigration hold” to “hold request,
notification request, and transfer request.” This change reflects SB 54’s
decision to wholly prohibit LEAs from honoring “hold requests”.
Additionally, SB 54 reduces the period for conviction of a wobbler
felony from at any point to fifteen years and removes wobbler felonies
from the probable cause determination exception. Besides these
changes, the requirements of the TRUST Act remain largely
unchanged in their incorporation into SB 54.

42. We discussed notification requests in our earlier section on restrictions on
communications. See supra subsection B.1.1.
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5. Other Restrictions on Participating in Immigration
Enforcement

SB 54 flatly prohibits “office space exclusively dedicated for
immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement
facility” and the use of “immigration authorities as interpreters for law
enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department
custody.”43 These two prohibitions relate to SB 54’s goal of
disentangling federal immigration authorities from local law
enforcement as they remove federal immigration agents from the dayto-day operations of local law enforcement.
SB 54 also restricts “[contracting] with the federal government for
use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house
individuals as federal detainees, except pursuant to Chapter 17.8.”44
Chapter 17.8 allows ongoing contracts to continue to operate but
prohibits renewal or expansion of such contracts.45 ICE frequently
contracts with local law enforcement to rent out jail beds to be used by
immigration detainees.46 These arrangements are financially beneficial
for the local law enforcement agency as it ensures they receive funding
for filling their jail to capacity.47 Despite their financial benefits, these
arrangements further local LEA entanglement with federal
immigration enforcement as they require LEA participation in the
detention of individuals on the basis of immigration violations.
6. The California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitations
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations
(“CDCR”) is explicitly excluded from SB 54’s definition of law
enforcement agency and is given its own set of restrictions and
43. S.B. 54, 2017 Leg. § 3, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 9 (West).
44. S.B. 54 § 3, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 8.
45. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7311(a) (“A city, county, city and county, or local law
enforcement agency that, as of June 15, 2017, has an existing contract with the federal government
or any federal agency to detain adult noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody, shall
not renew or modify that contract in such a way as to expand the maximum number of contract
beds that may be utilized to house or detain in a locked detention facility noncitizens for purposes
of civil immigration custody.”).
46. Amanda Sakuma, Donald Trump’s Plan to Outsource Immigration Enforcement to
Local
Cops,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
18,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-immigration-enforcement/517071/.
47. Sakuma, supra note 46.
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requirements.48 Unlike law enforcement agencies, the CDCR has no
restrictions placed on its discretion to honor hold, notification, or
transfer requests.49 As a small consolation, the CDCR must inform the
individual in question whether it intends to comply with any of these
requests.50 Similarly, SB 54’s prohibitions on inquiring into
immigration status, office space, interpreters, and housing federal
detainees do not apply to the CDCR.
Instead, SB 54 expands the provisions of the TRUST Act to cover
the CDCR and prohibits discrimination on the basis of immigration
status within the CDCR. Under the TRUST Act, California law
enforcement agencies were required to provide written consent forms
to individuals held in custody in advance of any interview with ICE
regarding civil immigration violations. SB 54 requires those same
consent forms be given in individuals in the custody of the CDCR in
those same circumstances. Furthermore, prior to SB 54, the CDCR
would take into account immigration status in determining an inmate’s
custodial classification. Essentially, this meant that individuals with
known civil immigration violations or pending notices to appear,
deportation orders, etc. would be held in higher security facilities and
denied access to certain prison programs.51 SB 54 explicitly prohibits
any restrictions on these programs based on immigration status as well
as “[consideration] of immigration status . . . in determining a person’s
custodial classification level.”52

48.
49.
50.
51.

S.B. 54, 2017 Leg., 2017-18 Reg. Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 9.
S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6-7.
S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 11.
INFORMATION FOR CALIFORNIA STATE PRISONERS WITH IMMIGRATION HOLDS,
PRISON
L.
OFF.
(Mar.
2012),
http://prisonlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/ImmigrationManualFullMarch2012.pdf.
As of March 2012,
[u]nder CDCR rules, an immigration hold does not increase your classification
score, but it is a case factor that will be noted in your classification documents and
might affect where you will be housed. For example, if you have an immigration
hold you cannot be housed at a Level One minimum security facility that does not
have gun towers. You are also more likely to be transferred to one of the CDCR’s
out-of-state facilities if you have an immigration hold. An immigration hold may
prevent you from participating in some programs, such as Prison Industries
Authority (PIA) jobs, the Family Foundations Program, the Alternative Custody
Program, substance abuse programs, or work furlough.
Id. at 6-7.
52. S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 11.
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C. The Federal Government’s Response to SB 54

While the overall constitutionality of SB 54 is not the focus of this
Article, it is important to highlight that the federal government has
strongly disapproved of SB 54. On March 6, 2018, the U.S. Department
of Justice filed suit against the state of California alleging that three
California laws, including SB 54, violate the Supremacy Clause53 and
section 1373 of title 8 of the United States Code, a federal law
prohibiting restrictions on communication of an individual’s
immigration status to immigration authorities.54
In direct response to SB 54, ICE55 has stated that it intends to
increase its activities in California to counteract the lack of assistance
from state and local law enforcement and has initiated numerous raids
across Northern California56 on this basis.57
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
54. Complaint at 17-18, United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-00264, (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2018) ECF No. 1 (The U.S. Department of Justice filing suit in E.D. Cal. and seeking relief that
provisions of A.B. 450, A.B. 103, and S.B. 54 should be held invalid).
55. Christopher Cadelago, ICE Director Plans More Neighborhood Arrests After
California’s ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 7, 2017, 7:58 AM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article177503311.html
(“The
Trump administration’s immigration chief warned Friday that his agents will be making more
arrests in California neighborhoods and workplaces because Gov. Jerry Brown signed a
‘sanctuary state’ law. Tom Homan, acting director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
said Brown’s decision to sign Senate Bill 54, which offers more protections for unauthorized
immigrants, undermines public safety and hinders his department from performing its federally
mandated mission, adding that “the governor is simply wrong when he claims otherwise. SB 54
‘will inevitably result in additional collateral arrests, instead of focusing on arrests at jails and
prisons where transfers are safer for ICE officers and the community,’ Homan warned.”).
56. Hamed Aleaziz, Immigration Agents Raid 77 Northern California Workplaces; No
Arrests Reported, SFGATE (Feb. 2, 2018, 9:42 AM) https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/ICEworkplace-sweep-hits-Northern-California-12544863.php (“Federal immigration agents raided
77 businesses in Northern California [the week of friday February 2, 2018], demanding proof that
their employees are legally allowed to work in the United States, officials said Thursday. It was
believed to be the largest such localized sweep of workplaces by the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agency since President Trump took office. ICE agents swept into nearly 100 7Eleven stores nationwide last month and arrested 21 suspected undocumented immigrants.
Thomas Homan, the agency’s acting director, has called for a ‘400 percent increase’ in such
workplace operations.”).
57. Alene Tchekmedyian, 150 Arrested in Northern California Immigration Sweep; ICE
Official Says Others Eluded Authorities After Oakland Mayor’s ‘Reckless’ Alert, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2018, 11:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-norcal-immigrationarrests-20180227-story.html (“Federal agents arrested more than 150 people suspected of
violating immigration laws during a three-day sweep across Northern California, authorities said
[Tuesday, February 27]. About half of those arrested have criminal convictions. A top
Immigration and Customs Enforcement official said he thought others were able to elude arrest
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Given this federal hostility to SB 54, California law enforcement
agencies who wish to circumvent the protections of SB 54 do so with
implicit approval from the federal government. In fact, both Orange58
and San Diego County59 voted to join in the United States Justice
Department’s lawsuit against SB 54.60 In both instances, the county
Board of Supervisors cited concerns about SB 54’s negative impact on
public safety61 but did not elaborate on specific instances where SB 54
opposed public safety. Going even further, on March 19, 2018, the city
council of Los Alamitos, the second-smallest city in Orange County,
voted to exempt itself from SB 54.62 Even if these actions are no more
than empty words they still demonstrate the open hostility to SB 54 that
exists across California.
In the next section we will examine where these prohibitions in
SB 54 fall short of meeting the overarching goal of restricting
California LEA cooperation and communication with federal
immigration enforcement.
II.

FALLING SHORT: THE VULNERABILITIES OF SB 54

Of course, no legislation is ironclad, and SB 54 is no exception.
SB 54 falls short in a number of areas and fails to address key features
of federal immigration enforcement that still allow LEAs to cooperate
after the Oakland mayor alerted the public about the upcoming raids. ICE Deputy Director
Thomas D. Homan blasted so-called sanctuary laws in San Francisco and Oakland, saying they
endanger immigration officers who aren't allowed in jails and therefore must make more arrests
in the community.”).
58. Bob Egelko, Orange County Joins Lawsuit Against California Over Sanctuary Law,
S.F. CHRONICLE (Mar. 28, 2018, 8:47 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/OrangeCounty-joins-lawsuit-against-California-12789323.php.
59. San Diego County to Join Lawsuit Against SB 54, California’s Sanctuary State Law,
NBC 7: SAN DIEGO (Apr. 18, 2018, 5:41 PM), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/SanDiego-County-Joins-Lawsuit-Against-SB54-480039933.html [hereinafter San Diego County to
Join Lawsuit].
60. Complaint at 17-18, United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-00264, (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2018) ECF No. 1 (The U.S. Department of Justice filing suit in E.D. Cal. and seeking relief that
provisions of AB 450, AB 103, and SB 54 should be held invalid).
61. Egelko, supra note 58 (“Bartlett, the county supervisor, said, ‘This is not a racial issue,
and no amount of race-baiting by Mr. de León will make it one. This is about complying with
laws and protecting public safety.’”); San Diego County to Join Lawsuit, supra note 59 (“Both
[Supervisor] Gaspar and [Supervisor] Jacob repeatedly said the decision was based on
maintaining public safety and keeping criminals out of the region.”).
62. Roxana Kopetman, Los Alamitos Votes to Opt Out of California Sanctuary Law,
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/19/los-alamitosimmigration-debate-sparks-singing-shouting/.
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with and share information with ICE. In some instances, the
vulnerability is the narrow language used by SB 54—words such as
“primary purpose” and “exclusive.” In other instances, the
vulnerability is SB 54’s and, to a large extent, the State of California’s
inability to rectify ongoing issues with federal immigration
enforcement, including practices such as database mining and
immigration detention. Although these vulnerabilities by no means
nullify the protections enacted by SB 54, they allow California LEAs
and ICE to undermine these protections and engage in precisely the
behavior sought to be prevented by SB 54.
A. Inquiring About Place of Birth as a Proxy for Asking About
Immigration Status
SB 54 explicitly prohibits any law enforcement agency from
inquiring about an individual’s immigration status, however, there are
certainly ways to infer immigration status without ever directly asking
an individual’s immigration status. An officer might ask an individual
their place of birth,63 for example, as an individual not born in the
United States might not be a citizen and could be in the country
63. See Memorandum from the L.A. Police Department on Immigration Enforcement
Procedures
(Dec.
29,
2017),
available
at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4365811/2017-12-29-COP-NoticeImmigration.pdf:
Place of Birth Inquiries
Some members of the public may misperceive the purpose of inquiring about a
person’s birthplace when questioned during a law enforcement contact, especially
when contacting the police as a victim or witness. To minimize the potential
misperception and possible degradation of public trust, the following procedures
shall take effect:
• Victims, Witnesses and Temporarily-Detained Suspects. Officers shall not ask
a victim, witness, or temporarily-detained individual for his or her place of
birth unless necessary under the particular circumstances to investigate a
criminal offense.
• Arrestees. Department personnel may ask and record an arrestee’s place of birth
when it is:
o
Necessary to book or process the arrestee for a criminal offense;
o
Necessary to comply with consular notification obligations,
o
Necessary to investigate a criminal offense; or,
o
Otherwise required by law.
• Field Interview Cards. Department personnel shall no longer record a victim,
witness or temporarily detained individual’s place of birth on Field Interview
Cards, Form 15.43.00, unless an exception set forth above applies.
Id.
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unlawfully. Thus, it is possible that an officer or an LEA might use
questions regarding birth place as a proxy for immigration status.
These proxy questions may have a legitimate purpose, such as
consular notification,64 and thus, likely cannot be prohibited altogether.
An officer asking an individual on the street his place of birth without
even reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing is certainly more
problematic than an officer asking a properly-arrested and booked
individual his place of birth. As a practical matter these aspects of
criminal procedure—proper booking questions, legitimacy of police
stops, etc.—are beyond the reach of SB 54 and our memorandum and
will not be explored in depth. Regardless, unless such proxy questions
are commonly asked to individuals not in custody and with no
reasonable suspicion, it is unlikely that such proxy questions pose a
significant issue. In fact, there is nothing to indicate that such questions
have been used as a proxy for determining immigration status, and at
this time, it remains a hypothetical exercise. Even if an LEA
communicates an individual’s place of birth directly to ICE, that does
not circumvent SB 54’s protections on ICE’s ability to take custody.
Furthermore, an individual’s place of birth, on its own does not give
LEOs cause to arrest an individual.
B. The “Primary Purpose” Requirement of Participation in a
Joint Task Force
SB 54 prohibits law enforcement agencies from entering into a
joint task force (“JTF”) only if that JTF’s primary purpose is civil
immigration enforcement. By its language, SB 54 does not preclude
JTFs with DHS or even ICE.65 While SB 54 requires the Attorney
General to compile and release data on the number of immigration
arrests that result from participation in JTFs with specific federal
agencies, that report is not due until March 2019 and does not place
further restrictions on JTFs.66
The potential vulnerabilities lie in the operation of the phrase
“primary purpose” as SB 54 does not clearly explain what the threshold
is.67 On the one hand, immigration authorities can represent, or even
misrepresent, the purpose of a JTF as not primarily for immigration
enforcement when there is a high probability that arrests for civil
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 9.
S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 10.
S.B. 54, 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 9.
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immigration violations will be made. On the other hand, a noncompliant law enforcement agency can seek out JTFs with immigration
authorities when they know, or believe, that their non-immigration
related police work could result in arrests for civil immigration
violations that the LEA would not be able to make on their own under
SB 54. These two scenarios, do not really run afoul of SB 54 as their
primary purpose, on its face, does not implicate civil immigration
enforcement even though that is the ultimate outcome.
In fact, the first scenario is not speculation, it already happened
twice before SB 54. The Santa Cruz Police Department entered into a
JTF with DHS to aid in gang-related arrests in a dozen residences.
During the February 13, 2017, raid, a number of individuals were
arrested based on criminal offenses. DHS also arrested more than 10
other individuals on solely immigration-related offenses.68 The Santa
Cruz Police Department alleges that they were misled about the
probability and number of immigration-related arrest while DHS
counters that the Santa Cruz Police Department was well informed that
the operation had a high probability of resulting in such arrests.69 On
August 16, 2017, the Oakland Police Department participated in a JTF
with ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations branch. The alleged
purpose of the investigation was to investigate human trafficking.
However, during the course of serving the search warrant, no one was
arrested for human trafficking violations. The only arrest made was for
a civil immigration violation and the arrested individual was placed in
deportation proceedings.70 The Oakland Police Department’s role
68. David Marks, Santa Cruz Police: ICE Lied to Us About Immigration Arrests, KQED
NEWS: CAL. REP. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/02/24/santa-cruz-police-icelied-to-us-about-immigration-arrests/. Santa Cruz Assistant Police Chief Dan Flippo said:
the gang-related arrests at about a dozen residences were the culmination of a fiveyear investigation launched when a Santa Cruz resident called police to complain
about gang members extorting local businesses. He said his department enlisted
the help of DHS because of the gang's notoriety and global reach, and that the raids
were made because it appeared gang members were planning another killing. But
Flippo also said 10 or more additional people who agents encountered at the
residences were detained solely on immigration charges.
Id.
69. Id. (“We worked closely with the Santa Cruz Police Department over the last five years
on this case . . . Allegations that the agency secretly planned an immigration enforcement action
in hopes there would be new political leadership that would allow for an alleged 'secret' operation
to take place are completely false, reckless and disturbing.”).
70. Ali Tadayon, Commissioner: Raid Violated Oakland Sanctuary City Policy, EAST BAY
TIMES:
COMMUNITY
NEWS
(Nov.
10,
2017,
12:09
PM),
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during the search was allegedly relegated to traffic control outside of
the residence. Oakland Police Chief, Anne Kirkpatrick, was scheduled
to give a report about the raid in a public hearing on November 14,
2017. However, that hearing has been indefinitely postponed.71
Examining these two incidents under SB 54, it is unclear that
either LEA violated the restrictions on JTFs. SB 54’s only prohibition
concerns the nebulous concept of the “primary purpose” of the JTF. If,
for example, each JTF had the “primary purpose” of enforcing state
criminal law then SB 54 would allow that JTF. Of course, it is not
compulsory for an LEA to engage in a JTF and repeated incidents
where the LEA feels that they have been misled could result in that
LEA’s refusal to enter into JTFs with certain federal agencies.72 As it
stands, SB 54 clearly does contemplate that immigration arrests will
result in the course of JTFs as it explicitly requires the number of such
arrests to be disclosed to the California Attorney General and the
public. Thus, SB 54 places the onus on individual LEAs to regulate
their entry into JTFs.
C. Databases
SB 54 delegates the task of publishing guidelines and
recommendations to limit the availability of information in databases
that can be used in immigration enforcement to the Attorney General,73
but as more information about ICE access to databases comes to light
the vulnerabilities appear much more significant. While it remains to
be seen what specifically will be done to address these concerns, it is
unclear exactly how far LEAs are willing to go in an effort to stymie
that amount of information in databases accessible to ICE.74
https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/10/05/commissioner-raid-violated-oakland-sanctuary-citypolicy/.
71. Id. (“The commission voted to recommend the City Council demand Kirkpatrick
present a report on the raid during a public hearing. Oakland police officials were scheduled to
address the allegations at a Nov. 14 Public Safety Committee meeting, but the hearing has been
indefinitely postponed.”).
72. Marks, supra note 68 (“[Police Chief Kevin] Vogel said the department no longer trusts
the Department of Homeland Security, which includes Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and will no longer work with the agency.”).
73. S.B. 54, 2017 Leg. § 3, 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 10-11 (West).
74. George Joseph, New Documents Reveal How ICE Mines Local Police Databases
Across the Country, MEDIUM: IN JUST. TODAY (Apr. 26, 2018), https://injusticetoday.com/newdocuments-reveal-how-ice-mines-local-police-databases-across-the-country-660e2dfddbe3
[hereinafter Joseph, New Documents] (“While some local officials are calling for greater
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Currently, “[ICE] software ingests local police databases,
allowing users to map out people’s social networks and browse data
that could include their countries of origin, license plate numbers, home
addresses, alleged gang membership records, and more.”75 These
databases allow ICE to pull together an in-depth profile of an individual
incredibly quickly.76 With access to “information on employers,
associates, and hangout spots,”77 ICE is easily able to independently
take custody of identified individuals.
However, even incidentally giving ICE access to such a wealth of
personal information LEAs endanger immigrants. Where SB 54 seeks
to impose limitations on communication of information to ICE, ICE
access to law enforcement databases is essentially unfettered. With no
limitations, information from these databases could lead ICE to arrest
many low-level offenders or individuals with no arrests other than just
having ties to others under investigation.78
In fact, ICE’s reliance on these databases has contributed to the
detention and even deportation of United States citizens.79
[I]n three dozen false arrest lawsuits, Americans caught in the
ICE dragnet alleged that officers took them into custody on
the basis of cursory computer searches. The agents, according
to the lawsuits, often overlooked evidence of citizenship such
as passports, and failed to examine paper files or conduct
interviews to confirm the accuracy of their database

transparency regarding their data-sharing with ICE, none have definitively called for their police
departments to stop using COPLINK or limit ICE’s access to their residents’ data through, for
example, amendments to the agencies’ data-sharing agreements. While legal experts differ on
whether or not cities could prevent ICE from accessing local police data altogether, Crockford
says amending such agreements would weaken ICE’s ability to mine millions of records at once
and instantly piece together people’s connections.”).
75. Joseph, New Documents, supra note 74.
76. Joseph, New Documents, supra note 74 (“Work that would have taken months in the
past, and required piecing together disparate data points from agencies across the state, can now
be done with a few clicks, says Lieutenant Michael Kmiec of the Lynn Police Department in
Massachusetts.”).
77. Joseph, New Documents, supra note 74.
78. George Joseph, Where ICE Already Has Direct Lines to Law-Enforcement Databases
With Immigrant Data, NPR: CODE SWITCH (May 12, 2017; 1:44 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/12/479070535/where-ice-already-has-directlines-to-law-enforcement-databases-with-immigrant-d [hereinafter Joseph, Where ICE]
79. Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, ICE Held an American Man in Custody for 1,273 Days.
He’s Not the Only One Who Had to Prove His Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html.
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searches. 80
Although extensive, the databases ICE uses are not always fully
accurate; inaccurate digital fingerprints, incomplete documentary
records, or even misspellings in an individual’s name can lead to an
individual being incorrectly identified as deportable despite being a
U.S. citizen.81
This problem has no easy solution, in large part due to the
significant law enforcement benefit of databases. “Law enforcement
officials and former ICE agents say the sharing of these databases and
analytic tools helps ICE Homeland Security Investigations — the
agency’s investigative arm — tackle serious crimes, like child
pornography and money laundering.”82 While databases can certainly
be misused in the pursuit of immigration enforcement, they are also a
powerful tool for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
D. “Exclusive” Office Space
Another instance of vague and potentially abusable language lies
in SB 54’s prohibition on office space in law enforcement facilities
“exclusively” dedicated to federal immigration authorities. A literal
reading of that prohibition seems to allow the creation of “shared”
office space that is used “primarily” but not “exclusively” by federal
immigration authorities. While such temporary office space might be
necessary in instances where the law enforcement agency is engaged
in a JTF with DHS or ICE, limitations on JTFs already prohibit those
whose primary purpose is immigration enforcement. It is unclear what,
if any, purpose this prohibition on exclusive office space serves when
immigration authorities can, very easily, still gain access to office space
within law enforcement facilities.
The obvious recommendation for such a narrow prohibition is to
broaden it depending on its ultimate goal. If the goal is to allow office
space for when law enforcement is engaged in a JTF with immigration
authorities, then that can be explicitly allowed while still broadening
the prohibition. If the goal is to require immigration authorities to use
their own equipment within law enforcement facilities or to push
immigration authorities out of law enforcement facilities altogether

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Joseph, New Documents, supra note 74.
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except for interviews or transfers then, once again, the prohibition
should be broadened.
E. The Inherent Coerciveness of Custody
Although beyond the purview of SB 54, it is well understood that
law enforcement custody has an inherent coercive effect on an
individual83 and SB 54's attempt to address this through mandatory
consent forms may fall short in some situations. The TRUTH Act
requires mandatory written consent forms, available in six languages,
to be given to any individual in local law enforcement custody prior to
any interview with ICE regarding civil immigration violations. This
requirement is extended to the CDCR by SB 54. As Ms. Merton from
Freedom for Immigrants explains, many people in custody either do
not understand the languages of the consent forms or are simply
illiterate.84 In either case, law enforcement does not always have the
ability or the desire to provide a translator or interpreter.85 This leads
to instances where individuals sign the form without at all
comprehending its significance.86 SB 54 attempts to address this by
requiring that the consent forms are provided in English, Spanish,
Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Korean. SB 54 itself does not
address language availability beyond these six languages, thus a
potential solution is to expand the language availability requirements
of SB 54 to require a consent form to be presented in the individual's
language or, in the case of illiteracy, require an interpreter to explain
the consent form's protections.
F. Detention Facilities
As noted earlier, SB 54 restricts LEAs from expanding or entering
into new contracts with the federal government for housing federal
detainees. SB 54 itself does not address closing existing immigration
detention facilities or mandating minimum conditions. While many
immigrant rights groups have serious concerns over the conditions in
federal facilities, including those contracted out to local LEAs, the
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
84. Telephone Interview with Rebecca Merton, Independent Monitor & National
Visitation Network Coordinator, Freedom for Immigrants (Apr. 18, 2018) (transcript of interview
on file with authors).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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wholesale closing of such facilities in California without some
workable alternative in place comes with serious consequences.87
Immigration detention is massive feature of the federal
government's immigration enforcement process;88 thus, any action
taken by California against federal detention facilities would not fully
address the issue and could worsen the circumstances of Californians
in detention. The federal government mandates that ICE fill 34,000
beds with immigration detainees each day.89 Additionally, ICE
operates numerous detention facilities across the United States and
many in California that have no connection to any California LEA.90
While prohibiting contracting with the federal government to operate a
federal detention facility ultimately places federal immigration
enforcement outside the hands of California LEAs, it significantly
worsens the situation of any Californian taken into immigration
detention, as it would potentially take them away from their family,
away from any California attorney, and away from the reach of any
California law protecting them.91
Additionally, unlike 287(g) programs,92 ICE provides significant
compensation for the use of LEA facilities93 for immigration
detention.94 In Contra Costa County, the county received about half of
the six million dollars from the United States Department of Justice for
operating the West County Immigration Detention Facility goes to
87. Id.
88. United States Immigration Detention, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT (May 2016),
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states/.
89. Detention
Bed
Quota,
NAT’L
IMMIGRANT
JUST.
CTR.
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/eliminate-detention-bed-quota (last visited May 16, 2018).
90. Immigration
Detention
Map
&
Statistics,
ENDISOLATION.ORG,
http://www.endisolation.org/resources/immigration-detention/ (last visited May 16, 2018).
91. Id.
92. See supra subsection I.B.1.2 and accompanying notes.
93. Monica Lam, How the Contra Costa County Sheriff Works With ICE, KQED NEWS:
CAL. REP. (May 19, 2017), https://www.kqed.org/news/11466901/how-the-contra-costa-countysheriff-works-with-ice. See Detention Services Intergovernmental Agreement between the United
States Marshals Service & Contra Costa West County Detention Facility (Sept. 21, 2009),
available
at
https://www.usmarshals.gov/foia/IGAs_Cap_Agreements/california/contra_costa_county.pdf.
94. Jazmine Ulloa, Most California Sheriffs Fiercely Opposed the ‘Sanctuary State’ Law.
Soon They’ll Have to Implement It, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017, 12:05 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-sanctuary-state-california-sheriffs-20171112htmlstory.html (“But in Orange County, Hutchens has a $7.27 million contract to incarcerate
immigrant detainees convicted of crimes, as well as a $22 million annual lease to provide ICE
with jail beds.”).
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paying employee salaries; and not just those employees involved in the
operation of the detention facility.95 Contra Costa County Sheriff David
Livingston has commented that he would be willing to end his
department’s contract with ICE if the County is willing to foot the bill
for the employees the contract with ICE pays for.96 Thus, even though
the ultimate purpose of these contracts is essentially to assist in federal
immigration enforcement, there are significant benefits to LEAs,
unrelated to immigration enforcement.
Similar to many other vulnerabilities, the issues surrounding
immigration detention cannot seriously be addressed by SB 54 alone.
Because of this, a better approach might be to address the extreme
human suffering caused by immigration detention97 to the extent
constitutionally permissible—for example, mandating standards for
the facilities of LEAs that enter into such contracts with ICE. In fact,
California has attempted to do just that with AB 103 which requires the
California Attorney General to review the conditions of immigration
detention centers, including those operated by California law
enforcement.98
G. The Fine Line Between Misunderstanding and Purposeful
Noncompliance
When SB 54 and other related guidelines are not followed by an
LEA, it might not always be clear whether that failure stemmed from a
genuine misunderstanding of obligations or a purposeful scheme to
circumvent the law. In some instances, that distinction becomes almost
impossible to make. On March 8, 2018, the San Francisco Sheriff’s
Department allowed ICE officers to interview an inmate held in
Sheriff’s Department custody.99 This interview violated the TRUTH

95. Telephone Interview with Rebecca Merton, supra note 84.
96. Id.
97. Miriam Valverde, How Do Standards Measure Up At Immigration Detention Centers?
A Special Report, POLITIFACT (Sept. 6, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2017/sep/06/immigration-detention-expansion/ (“Throughout the years, watchdog
groups and advocates have reported neglect and inadequate conditions at several immigration
detention facilities operated by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement and contracted
facilities.”).
98. Assemb. B. 103, 2017 Leg., 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 23 (West).
99. Hamed Aleaziz, San Francisco Jail Let ICE Interview Inmate in Breach of Sanctuary
Policy, State Law, SFGATE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SanFrancisco-jail-let-ICE-interview-inmate-12748127.php [hereinafter Aleaziz, San Francisco Jail]
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Act’s requirement100 of a signed consent form and San Francisco’s
Sanctuary ordinance’s prohibition on assisting in immigration
enforcement by allowing ICE interviews of jail inmates.101 The
Sheriff’s Department maintains that this was not intentional and
mandated additional training on Department’s obligations under
California law and city ordinance.102 In an almost identical situation,
ICE agents were also allowed into Santa Clara County jails on March
7 and 8, in violation of Santa Clara County's prohibition on ICE access
to jails.103 While the majority of California sheriffs strongly opposed
SB 54104 and it comes as no surprise that many of these sheriffs still
desire to cooperate with ICE similarly to before SB 54,105 these
incidents are particularly troubling as San Francisco and Santa Clara
County have long-standing policies that extend beyond the baseline
restrictions of SB 54.106
These distinctions and repudiations are made more even more
worrisome due to SB 54’s complete lack of any enforcement or
punishment mechanism. While individual departments might
discipline their officers for failing to follow SB 54, it is unclear what
the recourse is for the State of California when LEAs consistently allow
negligent violations of SB 54. Unlike, for example, San Francisco’s
sanctuary ordinance, SB 54 does not establish a formalized complaint
procedure and there is no indication that violating LEAs might be
required to pay out compensation.107

100. Assemb. B. 2792, 2016 Leg. § 3 [hereinafter TRUTH Act], 2015-16 Sess., 2016 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 4 (West).
101. Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 18.
102. Aleaziz, San Francisco Jail, supra note 99.
103. Hamed Aleaziz, ICE Gained Access to Santa Clara County Inmates, Breaching
Sanctuary
Policies,
S.F.
CHRONICLE
(Mar.
27,
2018,
6:00AM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/ICE-gained-access-to-Santa-Clara-Countyinmates-12783122.php.
104. Ulloa, supra note 94.
105. Id. (“[Fresno County Sheriff] Mims said her department is once more looking for ways
to increase its collaboration with ICE in the wake of new communication restrictions.”).
106. See infra subsection III.B.3 on selected policies covering San Francisco and Santa
Clara County.
107. Jonah Owen Lamb, Man to Receive $190,000 from SF for Sanctuary City Violation,
S.F. EXAMINER (June 28, 2017, 2:44 PM) http://www.sfexaminer.com/man-receive-190000-sfsanctuary-city-violation/ (“A man who San Francisco police turned over to immigration
authorities in violation of The City’s sanctuary ordinance is set to be awarded $190,000 in a
settlement agreement reached with the City Attorney’s Office, which his lawyer hopes will push
police to obey such laws.”)
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H. Making Release Dates and Other Information Publicly
Available

The practice of publicly posting inmate release dates poses a
serious threat the effectiveness of SB 54’s prohibitions on when an
LEA can allow ICE to take custody of an individual. Because this
practice triggers SB 54’s ‘publicly available information’ exception to
compliance with notification requests, an LEA, for all practical
purposes, has control over whether it is bound by SB 54’s baseline
restrictions on when ICE can take custody of an individual.
Furthermore, because the release date is publicly available this practice
essentially gives full discretion on whether to take custody of an
individual to ICE.
Although SB 54 differentiates between notification and transfer
requests, the practical consequence of LEA compliance with either is
the same—ICE custody. The publicly-available information exception
only applies to compliance with a notification request, thus if ICE only
sends a transfer request to an LEA with publicly-available release
dates, the LEA may not comply unless the conditions of the TRUST
Act108 are met or there is a judicial warrant or probable cause
determination.109 However, ICE can instead send a notification request
which the LEA can comply with if it makes release dates publicly
available. Taken together, notification and transfer requests are ICE’s
means of assuming custody of an individual in LEA custody, but there
is no requirement that the conditions for both must be met.110 By setting
restrictions on both methods, it is clear that SB 54 intended to create a
baseline set of conditions necessary for an LEA to comply with an ICE
request for custody, however, the difference between the two is a legal
distinction drawn based on exactly how ICE assumes custody.

108.
109.
110.

See supra subsection I.B.4.
See supra subsection I.B.4.
S.B. 54, 2017 Leg., 2017-18 Sess., 2017 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3 (West).
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Orange County Sheriff,111 Contra Costa County Sheriff,112 and
Alameda County Sheriff113 are now posting release date information
for all inmates online; essentially making the release date of any inmate
public information. Each county, however, has advanced a different
rationale for engaging in this practice. According to Orange County
Undersheriff Don Barnes, “[this practice] is in response to SB-54
limiting our ability to communicate with federal authorities and our
concern that criminals are being released to the street when there’s
another avenue to safeguard the community by handing them over (to
ICE for potential deportation).”114 In contrast, in Contra Costa County,
the same practice was implemented because
[publicly-available release dates] can be helpful to other
governmental organizations, crime victims, inmates’ family
members and others. Additionally, organizations115 who
provide services to persons released from custody have
specifically asked for this information so they can start reentry
transition assistance right away.116
Finally, Alameda County Sheriff maintains that publicly available
release dates are a way to further transparency.117 However,
[u]nlike Orange County and the Contra Costa Sheriff's Office
. . . the Alameda County Sheriff's website doesn't list all of the
currently incarcerated people along with their release dates in
111. Press Release, Orange Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., SB 54 Prompts Sheriff’s Department to
Publicly
Post
Inmate
Release
Dates
(Mar.
26,
2018),
available
at
http://www.ocsd.org/civicax/inc/blobfetch.aspx?BlobID=73747.
112. Aaron Davis & Nate Gartrell, Experts Concerned Contra Costa Sheriff Tipping Off
ICE by Posting Release Dates of Detained Immigrants, EAST BAY TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:45
PM), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2018/03/29/experts-concerned-contra-costa-sheriff-tippingoff-ice-by-posting-release-dates-of-detained-immigrants/.
113. Darwin Bond-Graham, Alameda County Sheriff’s Decision to Make Inmate Release
Dates Public Stirs Concern Among Immigrant Rights Advocates, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Apr. 3,
2018),
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2018/04/03/alameda-countysheriffs-office-decision-to-make-inmate-release-dates-public-stirs-concern-among-immigrantrights-advocates.
114. Roxana Kopetman, In Response to California Sanctuary Law, Orange County Sheriff
Makes Public Inmates’ Release Dates, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 28, 2018, 1:44 PM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/26/in-response-to-california-sanctuary-law-orange-countysheriff-makes-public-inmates-release-dates/.
115. According to Merton, reentry organizations identified public release dates as a potential
benefit for their organizations and included it in a rough draft of a memorandum but ultimately
scrapped the idea. Telephone Interview with Rebecca Merton, supra note 84.
116. Davis & Gartrell, supra note 112.
117. Bond-Graham, supra note 113.
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one document. Instead, users of the system still need to know
the name of a person who is detained in the jail before
obtaining their information.118
While the Orange County Sheriff intends to comply with transfer
requests on the basis of the public information exception, it is unclear
that Contra Costa and Alameda County Sheriffs intend to do the same.
We reached out to both for clarification but received no responses.
Unlike the other conditions SB 54 places on compliance with ICE
custody requests, publicly available release dates allow an LEA, acting
on its own, to satisfy the necessary condition to permit compliance with
an ICE custody request. SB 54 explicitly regulates LEA conduct, so it
follows that the conditions for LEA compliance with an ICE request
should be outside LEA control. However, this idea does not hold true
for all conditions of compliance. An LEA may comply with a
notification or transfer request if the requirements set forth in the
TRUST Act are met, but those conditions are wholly removed from an
LEA’s control. The TRUST Act requirements center around the
criminal convictions of the individual in question, thus if an individual
does not meet those requirements there is nothing an LEA can do to
change that. Similarly, an LEA cannot issue a judicial warrant or
probable cause determination. Almost paradoxically, however, an LEA
has control over whether an individual’s release date is public
information. It makes very little sense to give the regulated entity,
LEAs, control over the conditions which subject them to regulation. By
making inmate release dates publicly available, an LEA essentially
discards SB 54’s restrictions on notification and transfer requests and
substitutes its own discretion.
Publicly available release dates also allow ICE to independently
take custody of an individual without even relying on an LEA to honor
a notification request. Following the rationale of Contra Costa County,
even if release dates are made publicly available for reasons other than
cooperation with ICE,119 the fact that release dates are publicly
available potentially removes the need for ICE to rely on LEA
cooperation at all. As SB 54 describes it, a notification request is simply
a request from ICE to an LEA for notification of when an individual
will be released from LEA custody.120 If ICE already knows that
information by virtue of it being publicly available, the notification
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Davis & Gartrell, supra note 112.
See supra subsection I.B.4.

CALIFORNIA DIVIDED

33

request is all but a formality. ICE can simply check release date
information against DHS databases and ensure that ICE officers are
present when individuals with immigration violations are released.
Thus, even in instances where public release dates are well-intentioned
they could have significant consequences.
III.

THE DISCRETIONARY IMPLEMENTATION OF SB 54

A. Setting a Baseline for Law Enforcement Agencies
SB 54 merely sets the minimum standard of conduct a law
enforcement agency must abide by—a law enforcement agency’s
policies on how it exercises discretion can significantly change how
much protection is afforded to immigrants. Here, we examine the heads
of three typical, highly-visible LEAs: the county sheriff, the police
chief, and the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Commissioner. In
California, the county sheriff is an official directly elected by the
constituents of said county.121 Unlike the county sheriff, the police
chief is generally appointed by the mayor of a city or municipality.122
In contrast to the county sheriff and police chief, the CHP
Commissioner is appointed by the Governor of California.123 Police
jurisdiction covers incorporated municipalities; the duties comprise
preventing, suppressing, and investigating crimes; and police officers
provide emergency and non-emergency services.124 The CHP has
jurisdiction over all California state routes (including freeways), U.S.
highways, interstate highways, and all public roads, because its main
mission is related to transportation.125 That being said, some
121. See Tim Dees, Police Officers, Sheriffs, Rangers, and Marshals: What’s the
Difference?,
HUFFINGTON
POST:
BLOG
(Dec.
6,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-officers-sheriffs_b_7835320.html.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Highway Patrol, Statement by CHP Commissioner
Warren Stanley (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.chp.ca.gov/PressReleases/Pages/Statement-by-CHPCommissioner-Warren-Stanley.aspx.
124.
See, e.g., Bureau of Field Operations, SAN JOSÉ POLICE DEP’T.,
https://www.sjpd.org/BFO/ (last visited May 3, 2018) (showing the jurisdiction of San José Police
Department); see also POLICE OFFICER DUTIES, SAN JOSÉ POLICE DEP’T.,
https://www.sjpd.org/JoinSJPDBlue/PoliceOfficerDuties.html (last visited May 3, 2018).
125. See About Us, CAL. HIGHWAY PATROL, https://www.chp.ca.gov/home/about-us (last
visited May 3, 2018); see also Merger of the Highway Patrol and the State Police, CAL. HIGHWAY
PATROL,
https://www.chp.ca.gov/home/about-us/the-history-of-the-california-highwaypatrol/milestones-in-time/merger-of-the-highway-patrol-and-the-state-police (last visited May 3,
2018) (discussing CHP’s continued performance of preexisting service contracts originally
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municipalities, unincorporated areas, and towns contract with county
sheriffs to act as “contract law enforcement” for police services.126
In contrast to the CHP Commissioner and police chief, who have
distinct jurisdictions and responsibilities, county sheriffs may provide
supplemental law enforcement services by contract to neighboring
unincorporated areas (e.g., townships, smaller municipalities, etc.) and
are legally allowed to do so because the authority of California LEAs,
as peace officers, “extends to any place in the state [of California].”127
In other words, all peace officers in California are able to exercise their
police powers anywhere in the state, on or off duty, regardless of
county or municipal boundaries. Given the nature that the county
sheriff directly reports to his or her constituents—and since he or she
is directly elected by his or her constituents as opposed to political
appointment—the interests of the county sheriff’s department may
inherently be pulled in disparate directions.
For example, in the 2017–2018 fiscal year, the Contra Costa
County Sheriff’s Office faces an estimated general fund net cost of 43
million dollars.128 The Contra Costa County Sheriff attempts to make
up the difference through ancillary revenue, including providing
contract services to nearby cities, including Danville, Lafayette, and
Orinda.129 And, as discussed earlier, the Contra Costa County Sheriff
also receives millions of dollars in rent from the United States
government for the use of its jail facilities.130 Thus, resources such as
money and personnel prove to be important components to any county

provided by the California State Police).
126. See, e.g., STRAPPED CITIES THAT HIRED THE SHERIFF… IS IT WORKING? 1, SUPER. CT.
OF
SAN
MATEO
(July
25,
2013),
https://www.sanmateocourt.org/documents/grand_jury/2012/policing_services.pdf; Leroy D.
Baca, Welcome to Contract Law Enforcement, L.A. CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.lasdhq.org/lasd_services/contract_law/index.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130304185244/http://www.lasdhq.org/lasd_services/contract_la
w/index.html] .
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1(a) (West 2008).
128. OFF. OF THE AUDITOR-CONTROLLER, FISCAL YEAR 2017 – 2018 FINAL COUNTY
BUDGET
133,
CTY.
OF
CONTRA
COSTA,
http://www.cccounty.us/DocumentCenter/View/47424/2017-18-Final-County-Budget(last
visited May 12, 2018).
129. Id. at 135; Special Operations Division, CONTRA COSTA CTY. OFF. OF SHERIFF,
http://www.cocosheriff.org/bureaus/field_operations/special_operations/default.htm (last visited
May 14, 2018).
130. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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sheriff department’s budget and likely influences a California county
sheriff’s implementation of SB 54.
While there are a number of ways in which an LEA can exercise
discretion—e.g., participation in JTFs, permitting ICE interviews in
jails, etc.—one of the most important and most prominent is honoring
notification and transfer requests. Some LEAs believe cooperation with
ICE is necessary for safety,131 and while they will comply with SB 54,
they will do so in ways that allow them to cooperate with ICE as much
as possible (e.g., county sheriffs, in order to prolong their financial
relationships with ICE).132 Other LEAs believe that such cooperation
is not beneficial and go above and beyond SB 54 in enacting
protections for immigrants.133 In our examination of these differing
approaches, we will first examine the policies of selected counties,
cities, or law enforcement agencies and where they fit along this
spectrum. We will then focus on policies that we believe are against
the spirit of SB 54, even if they comply with the letter of the law, and
policies that we believe go beyond the minimum protections to address
vulnerabilities within SB 54.
B. The Dichotomy of California Law Enforcement Agency
Policies
1. Sticking to the Baseline – Orange, San Diego, and
Riverside County Sheriffs
Differences in implementation exist even in cases where an LEA
opts only for baseline compliance with SB 54. Despite the
vulnerabilities in SB 54, baseline compliance is not necessarily a
negative as it still ensures significant restrictions are put in place on an
LEA's ability to cooperate and communicate with federal immigration
enforcement. Implementation of baseline compliance of SB 54 occurs
on a scale—on the one end are the LEAs that strongly dislike SB 54
131. Ulloa, supra note 94 (“[Fresno County Sheriff] Mims said her department is once more
looking for ways to increase its collaboration with ICE in the wake of new communication
restrictions.”).
132. Madison Park, Orange County Votes to Join Feds to Oppose California’s ‘Sanctuary’
Law, CNN (Mar. 28, 2018, 7:16 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/28/us/orange-countysanctuary-state-law/index.html.
133. Gale Holland, California ‘Sanctuary’ Bill Gets Support from Law Enforcement,
Rebuke from Trump Administration, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017, 4:15 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-mcdonnell-immigration-20170916-story.html.
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and endeavor to actively find ways around it. In the middle are LEAs
do not fully support SB 54 but remain steadfast in their obligation to
implement it. On the opposite end are LEAs whose goals align with SB
54 but have not implemented additional policies. These three
approaches are illustrated by Orange County Sheriff, San Diego
County Sheriff, and Riverside County Sheriff respectively.
Orange County Sheriff’s Department has opposed SB 54,134 so it
comes as no surprise that their official policies mandated only baseline
compliance with the requirements of SB 54. Orange County Sheriff’s
official policy is to “comply with Immigration Detainers by notifying
ICE and releasing the inmate to ICE custody when the referenced
inmate qualifies in accordance with the Trust Act.”135 Essentially, there
is no room for discretion. Once the TRUST Act conditions are met, any
detainer will be honored. Furthermore, as discussed above,136 Orange
County Sheriff also made inmate release dates public to further
facilitate cooperation with ICE.137
Similar to Orange County Sheriff, San Diego County Sheriff
Department’s policy is to only comply with the minimum standards of
SB 54.138 Unlike Orange County, San Diego has not implemented
publicly available release dates. Furthermore, even though San Diego
County has voted to join the Justice Department lawsuit against SB 54,
the Sheriff’s Office has made clear that this does not release San Diego
from its obligations under SB 54.139
134. Press Release, Orange Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., OC Sheriff Sandra Hutchens’ Response to
SB
54
Amendments
(Sept.
12,
2017),
available
at
http://cssrc.us/sites/default/files/170926_OCSheriffHutchens_SB54OpposeLetter.pdf.
135. Memorandum from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department on Immigration
Enforcement
Procedures
(Dec.
2017),
http://www.iceoutofca.org/uploads/2/5/4/6/25464410/orange_county_sheriff__policy_1206.pdf.
136. Park, supra note 132.
137. Press Release, Orange Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., supra note 134.
138. Memorandum from the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department on Verification of
Legal
Status
Conformance
to
Immigration
Laws
(Dec.
28,
2017),
http://www.iceoutofca.org/uploads/2/5/4/6/25464410/san_diego_sheriffs_department_q.4_verifi
cation_of_legal_status_conformance_to_immigration_laws.pdf.
139. San Diego County to Join Lawsuit, supra note 59 (“The Sheriff's Department has and
will continue to comply with the Trust, Truth and California Values Acts. My deputies work hard
to make our communities safe and we want to ensure all of our residents feel comfortable
reporting crimes or coming forward as witnesses to criminal acts. Law enforcement at all levels
in the San Diego region has a strong culture of cooperation. The Sheriff's Department will
continue to comply with state law and will closely follow the federal lawsuit against the State of
California where this level of cooperation will ultimately be determined.”).
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Riverside County Sheriff is another LEA that opts for baseline
compliance with SB 54.140 However, unlike Orange and San Diego
counties, Riverside County and its sheriff have not been outspoken
critics of SB 54. In fact, according to their policy memorandum
addressing the additional requirements imposed by SB 54 explains that:
“[t]he Department position remains the same and [Riverside County
Sheriff does] not enforce immigration laws or use Department
resources for immigration enforcement. As such, the new mandates do
not significantly impact daily operations.”141 Thus, even though
Riverside County Sheriff honors all detainers for individuals who meet
the TRUST Act conditions,142 it is clear that such a policy is not
necessarily borne out of animosity towards the operation of SB 54.
Although none of these LEAs provide for greater protection than
is required by SB 54, it is clear from their rhetoric and interpretation of
SB 54 that there are differences in their willingness to abide by the
spirit of SB 54. Orange County Sheriff has made explicitly clear that it
disfavors SB 54 and has chosen to resolve ambiguities and
vulnerabilities in SB 54—namely, the publicly available information
exception—in favor of cooperation with federal immigration
enforcement. The San Diego County Sheriff takes no real position one
way or the other—despite the negative position taken by the County
Board of Supervisors—but remains faithful to its obligations under
state law. Finally, the Riverside County Sheriff states that its policies
in compliance with SB 54 existed some time before such policies were
made mandatory by state law—indicating some level of support for the
goals of SB 54.
2. Slight Modifications – San Mateo and Alameda
County Sheriffs
Other counties have chosen to slightly increase the protections
afforded by SB 54 – typically by narrowing conditions in which the
TRUST Act exceptions apply. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Department
policies keep stride with SB 54 with a few additional protections
relating to notification and transfer requests. To honor a notification or
140. Memorandum from the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department on Cooperation –
Federal
Immigration
Enforcement
Authorities
(Jan.
2,
2018),
http://www.iceoutofca.org/uploads/2/5/4/6/25464410/riverside_sheriff_sb_54_policy.pdf.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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transfer request, the individual in question must have been convicted
of a serious or violent felony or be the subject of a warrant or court
order signed by a judge or a magistrate143—a slightly narrower
category than the TRUST Act. Additionally, release information will
only be provided in response to an official inquiry and will not be
provided for inmates released on bail or their own recognizance.144
Alameda County Sheriff’s Department similarly narrows the criteria of
the TRUST Act. In their policy statement, the Sheriff’s Office notes
that certain crimes listed under the “wobbler offenses” category of SB
54’s amendments to the TRUST Act are straight misdemeanors.145 “In
no case shall cooperation occur pursuant to section 7282.5 [the TRUST
Act] for individuals arrested, detained, or convicted of misdemeanors
that were previously felonies or previously crimes punishable as either
misdemeanors or felonies prior to the passage of the Safe
Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014.”146
3. Going Above and Beyond – San Francisco City and
County Sheriff, Santa Clara County Sheriff, and Los
Angeles Police Department
Some counties have demonstrated their commitment to the goals
of SB 54 by enacting policies that provide for significantly increased
restrictions on cooperation and communication with federal
immigration enforcement.
San Francisco’s sanctuary city ordinance provides a number of
increased protections over SB 54. To begin with, San Francisco
significantly narrows the circumstances in which an LEA may respond
to a notification request. There is no public information exception and
the conviction exceptions require a recent conviction. For violent
felonies, the conviction must be within seven years; for serious
felonies, the conviction must be within five. And felonies punishable
by imprisonment in state prison or wobbler felonies must be within five

143. Memorandum from the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office on ICE Holds, Requests for
Notifications,
and
ICE
Interviews
(Jan.
2,
2018),
http://www.iceoutofca.org/uploads/2/5/4/6/25464410/san_mateo_4_09_ice_policy_1-2-18.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Memorandum from the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office on Communication with
Immigration
Authorities,
at
5
(Feb.
9,
2018),
http://www.iceoutofca.org/uploads/2/5/4/6/25464410/alameda_sherriffs_policy_2_2018.pdf.
146. Id.
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years and there must be three convictions arising out of separate
incidents.147
Additionally, San Francisco’s prohibition on using funds and
resources extends to any assistance in the enforcement of federal
immigration law, whereas SB 54 only prohibits the use of such funds
and resources in affirmative enforcement acts.148 This distinction helps
to explain why ICE agents are prohibited from interviewing inmates in
San Francisco jails.149 San Francisco sanctuary policy also requires
that, for every six months, a report be given to the Board of Supervisors
detailing all communications received from and made to federal
immigration enforcement agencies.150
Santa Clara County’s detainer policy sets a number of additional
limitations on cooperation with ICE. Santa Clara County will only
honor ICE requests when the individual has been convicted of a serious
or violent felony and the costs incurred by the county would be
reimbursed by the federal government.151 However, the federal
government since 2011 has not agreed to reimburse the costs of
honoring detainers thus no requests have been honored.152
Furthermore, much like San Francisco, Santa Clara County prohibits
ICE agents from accessing individuals in County facilities without a
criminal warrant or a legitimate law enforcement purpose unrelated to
immigration enforcement.153
The Los Angeles Police Department policies also provide a
number of protections beyond SB 54. LAPD’s policies prohibit all
custodial transfers to ICE except when there is a judicial warrant for or
prior conviction of a federal criminal immigration offense.154
Additionally, any JTF involving ICE or CBP must include “a provision
indicating that LAPD participants must comply with LAPD policies
147. Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 18.
148. Id.
149. Aleaziz, San Francisco Jail, supra note 99.
150. Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 18.
151. Santa Clara County, Cal., Policy Res. No. 2011-504, Resolution of the Board of
Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara Adding Board Policy 3.54 Relating to Civil Immigration
Detainer
Requests
(Oct.
18,
2011),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/santa_clara_ordinance.pdf
152. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Santa Clara County v. Trump,
No. 5:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017), ECF No. 1.
153. Santa Clara County, Cal., Policy Res. No. 2011-504.
154. Memorandum from the L.A. Police Department on Immigration Enforcement
Procedures (Dec. 29, 2017), supra note 59.
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and procedures regarding immigration enforcement during their
participation in any task force activity.”155 As a further protection, all
LAPD officers who participate in a JTF must sign an acknowledgement
indicating his or her understanding of LAPD policies and procedures
and LAPD’s stance on immigration enforcement.156 Finally, the LAPD
indicates that they will engage in place of birth inquiries only when
necessary to investigate a criminal offense, book or process an arrestee,
or comply with consular notification obligations.157
C. The California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation
Similar to law enforcement agencies, SB 54 grants the CDCR
discretion to honor hold, notification, and transfer requests from ICE.
Unlike law enforcement agencies, the CDCR has unrestricted
discretion and must account for different factors when deciding
whether to exercise discretion.
We contacted the CDCR to determine what guidelines have been
set with respect to honoring ICE requests but, at the time of this writing,
have not received a response. Thus, unfortunately, we can offer no
insight as to how the CDCR's policies stack up against SB 54’s
guidelines for Law Enforcement Agencies.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the identified vulnerabilities of SB 54, we recommend
several changes either in the form of a legislative amendment to SB 54
or LEA policy implementation.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The Los Angeles Police Department and Federal Immigration Enforcement:
Frequently Asked
Questions 7-8, L.A. POLICE DEP’T
(Jan. 22, 2018),
http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/immigration_enforce.pdf (“An officer, however, may ask
for and record an individual’s place of birth if the person is arrested for a criminal offense. This
is required to process the arrestee for a criminal offense, comply with consular notification
requirements, investigate a crime, or otherwise comply with the law.”). LAPD made
modifications to internal policies “to minimize the potential misperception and possible
degradation of public trust.” Id. at 7. (“The Department’s Field Interview Report (FI card) has
been redesigned and the ‘Birthplace’ field removed so offers do not ask or record the birthplace
of victims, witnesses, or temporarily-detained individuals unless an exception applies.”).
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A. Remove the Public Information Exception from Provisions of
SB 54
SB 54 allows an LEA to honor a notification request if the
information is public, regardless of whether the individual in question
falls under the conviction exceptions first enumerated by the TRUST
Act. A number of County Sheriffs158 have begun to exploit this function
of SB 54 by publicly posting the release date information for all
inmates, thus making it public information that can be communicated
to ICE. Of course, ICE can also look it up online.
Because SB 54 relies on restricting the ability of federal
immigration authorities to obtain custody of individuals held by local
LEAs, this practice is particularly troubling as it more or less
circumvents all limitations entirely.159 If an individual’s release date
falls within the public information exception, it does not matter
whether the individual was in LEA custody on the basis of a
misdemeanor or a felony. If that individual is deemed by ICE to have
committed immigration violations, he or she can be taken into ICE
custody immediately preceding his or her release from LEA custody.
Thus, we recommend either removing the public information
exception by legislative amendment or encourage LEAs to adopt an
internal policy prohibiting the release of public information of its
detainees.
B. Implement More Departmental Policy Acknowledgement
Procedures and Expand its Scope
Despite the protections offered by SB 54, one obstacle to its
implementations—even for LEAs that want to further its goals—is its
complexity. Even well-intentioned officers may slip up and act in a way
prohibited by SB 54 or LEA policies. Currently, the Los Angeles Police
Department requires officers who participate in any JTF to sign an
acknowledgement stating that they understand the department’s
policies in regard to SB 54.160 We believe that such an
acknowledgement is something that could be useful for all officers to
sign for a number of reasons. First, requiring such an acknowledgement
encourages individual LEOs to ensure that they actually understand
158. Id.
159. See supra subsection II.H.
160. Memorandum from the L.A. Police Department on Immigration Enforcement
Procedures (Dec. 29, 2017), supra note 63.
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their department’s policies and their obligations. Second, it increases
accountability in the sense that if an error is made then the LEA can
hold its officers responsible as they formally acknowledged their
understanding of their obligations. Third, it presents an opportunity for
the LEA to proactively educate officers and encourages the
development of transparent and clear policies.
C. Prohibit ICE Access to Jails
Although SB 54 is silent on the issue, San Francisco and Santa
Clara’s policies both prohibit ICE from accessing any inmate in a San
Francisco jail.161 This policy helps to protect inmates from the
inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation.162 We believe
this is a sound policy because conducting such interviews is wholly
unrelated to any of the criteria SB 54 sets forth as relevant for
determining that an LEA should honor a transfer or notification
request. Any ICE interview of an individual only serves the purpose of
advancing ICE’s case against that person relating to federal
immigration violations and, under SB 54, it is imperative to separate
such investigations from the typical duties of a local LEO.
D. Rely Upon Judicial Warrants and Probable Cause
Determinations Instead of Convictions
In setting forth conditions in which transfer and notification
requests will be honored, some LEAs limit the circumstances to
judicial warrants or judicial probable cause determinations. There are
a number of advantages to this approach. First, it is much easier for an
LEA to receive a judicial warrant or probable cause determination
compared to searching the individual’s criminal history and ensuring
any convictions match with the criteria of the TRUST Act.
Furthermore, it requires ICE to operate with judicial oversight and
imposes a greater degree of accountability. Finally, it ensures that the
individual poses a current public safety threat rather than honoring the
request on the basis of a crime committed any number of years in the
past or for a crime that was a straight misdemeanor.

161.
162.

Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 18.
Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
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E. Implement a Civilian Oversight Watchdog Organization
One potential means to ensure that SB 54 is followed is to create
an oversight committee to review an LEA’s compliance with SB 54
and department policies. An oversight committee will help ensure
violations of SB 54 are independently investigated and reviewed and
determine consequences for failing to follow SB 54. Although not in
response to SB 54, Los Angeles County created its Sheriff Civilian
Oversight Commission in January 2016 to improve transparency and
accountability within the Sheriff’s Department.163 With SB 54 and its
expansion of LEA responsibilities, it follows that such a committee
could also review an LEA's adherence to SB 54. San Francisco
provides another model on how to implement such oversight. San
Francisco’s sanctuary ordinance gives its Human Rights Commission
power to review compliance by the various departments and agencies
of the City and County.164 Regardless of the exact implementation, an
oversight committee can help to ensure an LEA’s compliance with SB
54 and other department policies.

163. See, e.g., L.A. CTY. SHERIFF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT COMM’N, https://coc.lacounty.gov/
(last visited May 16, 2018).
164. Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 18.
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CONCLUSION

SB 54 endeavors to significantly change the dynamic between
local law enforcement agencies and the enforcement of federal
immigration laws. Its protections, however, come hand-in-hand with
opposition and loopholes. While it is not perfect, SB 54 takes important
steps to disentangling local law enforcement from federal immigration
enforcement and ensures greater protections for California's immigrant
population. In many respects, the issues that SB 54 cannot solve—such
as ICE access to databases and detention facilities—are issues that
exceed California's control and implicate overarching problems with
federal immigration enforcement in general. SB 54 also brings to light
the remarkable desire of California's individual counties, cities, and law
enforcement agencies to enact their own stricter protections for their
immigrant populations. Despite all this, SB 54's effectiveness hinges
on actual compliance with its restrictions rather than mere statements
of policy. While we were not able to determine the extent to which law
enforcement agencies complied with SB 54 or their own policies, other
organizations within California are working on just that.

